Medical Malpractice Standard-Setting: Developing Malpractice  Safe Harbors  as a New Role for QIOs? by Blumstein, James F.
Vanderbilt Law Review 
Volume 59 Issue 4 Article 1 
5-2006 
Medical Malpractice Standard-Setting: Developing Malpractice 
"Safe Harbors" as a New Role for QIOs? 
James F. Blumstein 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Medical Jurisprudence Commons 
Recommended Citation 
James F. Blumstein, Medical Malpractice Standard-Setting: Developing Malpractice "Safe Harbors" as a 
New Role for QIOs?, 59 Vanderbilt Law Review 1017 (2019) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol59/iss4/1 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more 
information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu. 
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 59 MAY 2006 NUMBER 4
Medical Malpractice Standard-
Setting: Developing Malpractice
"Safe Harbors" as a New Role for
QIOs?
James F. Blumstein*
1. INTRODU CTION ................................................................... 1018
II. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE DOCTRINE: IN GENERAL .............. 1022
A. Some Conceptual Background ................................ 1022
B. The "Customary Practice" Standard of Care .......... 1023
C. The Problem of Uncertainty ......................... 1026
1. Clinical Uncertainty: Its Embarrassing
Im plications ................................................. 1026
2. Structural Uncertainty ................................ 1028
3. Im plications ................................................. 1029
III. A RESPONSE TO UNCERTAINTY: EXANTE
STANDARDS As SAFE HARBORS .......................................... 1031
A. Standard-Setting: Some Background ..................... 1032
B. Ex Ante Guidelines/Standards as Medical
M alpractice "Safe Harbors" ................................... 1034
IV. QIOS AND MEDICAL MALPRACTICE STANDARD-SETTING ... 1038
A. The PSRO Legislation: Some Background ............. 1038
B. Standard-Setting and Immunity-Conferring
A uthority of QIO s .................................................... 1038
University Professor of Constitutional Law and Health Law and Policy, Vanderbilt
University; Director, Health Policy Center, Vanderbilt Institute for Public Policy Studies.
1017
1018 VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW [Vol. 59:4:1017
C. Can QIOs Perform the Standard-Setting Role? ..... 1042
D. Are There Liability Risks Associated With the
Standard-Setting Process Itself? ............................ 1044
V . C O N CLU SION ....................................................................... 1046
I. INTRODUCTION
Concern about medical malpractice issues has reemerged,
again stemming from escalating costs in some geographic regions and
sectors of medical practice. The Bush Administration has (so far
unsuccessfully) supported' a cap 2 on noneconomic loss as a strategy
for coping with the cost aspects of those medical malpractice
concerns, 3 the model being the California approach.
4
1. Catherine M. Sharkey, Unintended Consequences of Medical Malpractice Damages
Caps, 80 N.Y.U.L. REV. 391, 394 (2005) (reporting on the Bush Administration's support for a
$250,000 cap on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases).
2. By the end of the 1980s, most states had capped awards in some fashion. Randall R.
Bovbjerg, Legislation on Medical Malpractice: Further Developments and a Preliminary Report
Card, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 499, 525 (1989). Most caps apply to nonpecuniary, not other,
components of damages. Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling
"Pain and Suffering," 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 908, 957 (1987). But see Etheridge v. Medical Center
Hosps., 376 S.E.2d 525 (Va. 1989) (upholding against constitutional challenge Virginia's total
damage cap in medical malpractice actions of $750,000); Boyd v. Bulala, 877 F.2d 1191 (4th Cir.
1989) (same). For criticism of flat caps, see Bovbjerg et al., supra, at 957-58 (proposing a system
of a flexible range of floors and ceilings as an alternative to a flat cap). For a thoughtful recent
proposal to address the problem of valuing noneconomic loss, see Ronen Avraham, Putting a
Price on Pain-and-Suffering Damages: A Critique of the Current Approaches and a Preliminary
Proposal for Change, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 87, 110 (2006).
3. For a critique of the legitimacy of damages for noneconomic loss, see, e.g., Joseph H.
King, Jr., Pain and Suffering, Noneconomic Damages, and the Goals of Tort Law, 57 SMU L.
REV. 163 (2004); Bovbjerg et al., supra note 2, at 931-32 (cataloguing arguments against awards
for noneconomic loss). For a proposal to limit noneconomic loss recoveries through a system of
incentives, see Jeffrey O'Connell et al., An Economic Model Costing "Early Offers" Medical
Malpractice Reform: Trading Noneconomic Damages for Prompt Payment of Economic Damages,
35 N.M. L. REV. 259 (2005). For arguments maintaining the validity of damage awards for
nonpecuniary loss, see James F. Blumstein, Making the System Work Better: Improving the
Process for Determination of Noneconomic Loss, 35 N.M. L. REV. 401, 409-11 (2005) [hereinafter
Blumstein, Making the System Work Better] (arguing in favor of controlling but not eliminating
jury discretion in making nonpecuniary damage awards); Ronen Avraham, Should Pain-And-
Suffering Damages Be Abolished from Tort Law? More Experimental Evidence, 55 U. TORONTO
L.J. 941 (2005) (contending that sovereign consumers would demand pain-and-suffering
insurance and concluding that pain-and-suffering damages advance the goals of tort law);
Bovbjerg et al., supra note 2, at 932-36 (arguing that pain-and-suffering damages advance the
insurance goal of tort law); Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, The Nonpecuniary Costs of
Accidents: Pain-and-Suffering Damages in Tort Law, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1785 (1995) (arguing
that pain-and-suffering damages are not against consumer interests); Mark Geistfeld, Placing a
Price on Pain and Suffering: A Method for Helping Juries Determine Tort Damages for
Nonpecuniary Injuries, 83 CAL. L. REV. 773 (1995) (providing a model for determining the
amount of pain-and-suffering damages). For skepticism about the viability or legitimacy of the
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Although the overall initiative for reform has considerable
merit,5 the damage-cap has its opponents and its drawbacks. 6 The
damage-cap approach is remedy-centric, focusing on the scope of
remedy as a vehicle for containing costs in the area of medical
malpractice. By concentrating on remedies, the reform of damage
caps assumes that a plaintiff can establish liability, as remedial issues
traditionally follow in the wake of and as a consequence of a finding of
liability.
In earlier work, colleagues and I have addressed the remedy
issue, focusing on damages for noneconomic loss. 7 The objective was
to develop a way to improve the system for awarding damages for
noneconomic loss.
8
The approach to reform put forward in this Article looks at the
medical-malpractice cost-containment issue in a different way. Like
the work on noneconomic damages, it is designed to improve the
functioning of the system; unlike that earlier work, however, its focus
is not on the remedy-damages issues-but on the determination of
liability. The systemic improvement is designed to allow for the
appropriate consideration of trade-offs between quality and risk on the
one hand and cost on the other.
That is, the approach developed in this Article is designed to
deal with the systemic cost-escalation aspects of the medical
distinction between economic and noneconomic loss, see Heidi Li Feldman, Loss, 35 N.M. L. REV.
375 (2005) (arguing that both pecuniary and nonpecuniary losses are injuries to welfare); Ellen
Smith Pryor, The Tort Law Debate, Efficiency, and the Kingdom of the Ill: A Critique of the
Insurance Theory of Compensation, 79 VA. L. REV. 91, 91-106, 125-36 (1993) (advocating
rejection of the insurance theory of compensation); Neil K. Komesar, Injuries and Institutions:
Tort Reform, Tort Theory, and Beyond, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 58 (1990) (arguing that prevention
is another important goal of tort law).
4. In 1975, California adopted a statutory cap on nonpecuniary damages for medical
malpractice actions in the amount of $250,000. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (2006). No provision for
upward adjustment for inflation was included. Id. See Fein v. Permanente Med. Group, 695 P.2d
665, appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 892 (1985) (upholding cap on nonpecuniary damages in medical
malpractice actions against constitutional challenge). Cf. Etheridge v. Medical Center Hosps.,
376 S.E.2d 525 (Va. 1989) (upholding against constitutional challenge Virginia's total damage
cap in medical malpractice of $750,000); Boyd v. Bulala, 877 F.2d 1191 (4th Cir. 1989) (same).
5. See Blumstein, Making the System Work Better, supra note 3, at 409-15 (noting that
noneconomic awards are the most variable component of damages but also an appropriate
component); Bovbjerg et al., supra note 2, at 936-65 (arguing for the validity of noneconomic
damages and the need for structured decisionmaking).
6. See supra note 2.
7. See Bovbjerg et al., supra note 2 (suggesting three methods for calculating
nonpecuniary damages); James F. Blumstein et al., Beyond Tort Reform: Developing Better Tools
for Assessing Damages for Personal Injury, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 171 (1991) (offering two proposals
for reforming damage calculations in specified circumstances).
8. Cf. Blumstein, Making the System Work Better, supra note 3, at 409-13 (developing
scenario proposal for improved jury determination of noneconomic loss).
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malpractice issue through modification of the process for determining
standards of liability in targeted areas. This reflects a different, albeit
complementary, approach to problems of medical-malpractice cost
escalation-a departure from the remedy-focused policy issues that
have traditionally dominated the medical malpractice reform debate
for years. The unit of inquiry is not on the damages component of the
medical negligence liability system but on the standards of conduct
themselves under the liability regime. 9  A particular reason for
concern about liability standards for medical malpractice is the
prevalence of third-party payment for medical care, which both
creates incentives for increased utilization of services' ° and provides
the financial vehicle for implementing that increased level of
utilization.
It is an objective of the torts system to deter certain risky
conduct-conduct that is deemed inappropriately risky, all things
considered. Providers are expected to respond to and conform their
behavior to standards of conduct set through the tort-liability-
determination process. The often-stated-but-hard-to-define problem of
defensive medicine1 is a claim by providers that over-deterrence is
occurring in medical practice. 12 Providers, according to this account,
9. Cf. James F. Blumstein, The Legal Liability Regime: How Well Is It Doing in Assuring
Quality, Accounting for Costs, and Coping With an Evolving Reality in the Health Care
Marketplace?, 11 ANNALS HEALTH L. 125, 130 (2002) [hereinafter Blumstein, The Legal Liability
Regime] (focusing on the standard of liability in medical negligence cases); E. HAAVI MORREIM,
HOLDING HEALTH CARE ACCOUNTABLE: LAW AND THE NEW MEDICAL MARKETPLACE (2001)
(considering medical malpractice liability standards in the context of cost-containment
objectives); James F. Blumstein, Cost Containment and Medical Malpractice [hereinafter
Blumstein, Cost Containment and Medical Malpractice], in HEALTH CARE DELIVERY AND TORT:
SYSTEMS ON A COLLISION COURSE? 89 (Elizabeth Rolph ed., 1993) [hereinafter Rolph] (discussing
how to accommodate cost-containment objectives with medical malpractice liability standards).
10. James A. Henderson, Jr. & John A. Siliciano, Universal Health Care and the Continued
Reliance on Custom in Determining Medical Malpractice, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1382, 1393 (1994).
11. See TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH 118-19 (2005) (noting the problem of
defining "defensive medicine" and the need for "distinguishing between the good, injury-
prevention effects of malpractice lawsuits and the bad, wasteful effects"). Defensive medicine
comes in a "negative" and a "positive" form. "When physicians avoid high-risk patients or
procedures to the detriment of patient health, they are practicing negative defensive medicine.
When physicians engage in precautionary treatment with minimal expected medical benefit
relative to the cost of the treatment, they are practicing positive defensive medicine." Daniel P.
Kessler & Mark B. McClellan, The Effects of Malpractice Pressure and Liability Reforms on
Physicians' Perceptions of Medical Care, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. Winter 1997, at 81, 82 n.11.
For an early empirical study of defensive medicine, see Project, The Medical Malpractice Threat:
A Study of Defensive Medicine, 1971 DUKE L. J. 939.
12. One study of defensive medicine defined it in relevant part as follows: "Defensive
medicine occurs when doctors order tests, procedures, visits, or avoid high-risk patients or
procedures, primarily (but not necessarily solely) to reduce their exposure to malpractice
liability." U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, DEFENSIVE MEDICINE AND
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, OTA-H-602, at 3 (1994). Under that definition, some defensive medicine
1020 [Vol. 59:4:1017
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conform their behavior to the uncertain risk of being found negligent
despite adhering to best, socially optimal practices. 13 Responding to
an uncertain (and in some practical sense unknowable-in-advance)
norm or standard of practice can raise the cost of medical practice,
both to the payer and to the provider, above an optimal level. In this
sense, the medical malpractice system, which is linked to practice
styles already influenced upward by the prevalence of third-party
payment, 14 may result in sub-optimal over-deterrence and higher costs
unjustified by their correlative benefits.
A premise of this Article is that the desired cost-containment
reformist goals underlying strategies such as caps on certain elements
of damages (e.g., pain and suffering) may be advanced by an improved
process of determining negligence and of determining standards of
practice themselves. 15
may be beneficial, since conforming behavior to a negligence-generated standard of conduct may
result in optimal levels of quality. Only defensive medicine, so defined, that results in over-
deterrence-in ordering tests "whose expected benefits are very low" because "physicians'
tolerance for uncertainty about medical outcomes" has been pushed to "very low levels" or to the
"lowest possible level," id., and whose costs are unjustified by the putative benefits-is sub-
optimal. For a good discussion of this issue, see Daniel Kessler & Mark McClellan, Do Doctors
Practice Defensive Medicine?, 111 Q.J. ECON. 353, 356 (1996) (noting that inappropriate
defensive medicine occurs when physicians take "excessive precaution... such that the marginal
social benefit of precaution would be less than the marginal social cost").
13. For expressions of skepticism of the defensive medicine account, see BAKER, supra note
11, at 134 (concluding that "the overall impact of ... defensive medicine on health-care costs is
not very large"); Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Deterrence of Medical Errors: Theory
and Evidence for Malpractice Reform, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1595, 1606-07 (2002) (noting that
overdeterence "rhetoric has not been firmly grounded in fact"). For recent survey evidence of
"widespread" defensive medicine practices among physicians in certain high-risk specialties, see
David M. Studdert et al., Defensive Medicine Among High-Risk Specialist Physicians in a
Volatile Malpractice Environment, 293 JAMA 2609, 2612, 2615 (2005) (analyzing survey data).
See also Daniel P. Kessler et al., Effects of the Medical Liability System in Australia, the UK, and
the USA, 368 LANCET 240 (2006) (reviewing "findings of empirical studies that estimate the
effects of tort law on medical care" and concluding that "[a]t least for the USA and UK, there is
systematic evidence of defensive medicine").
14. See Henderson & Siliciano, supra note 10, at 1392-93 (observing that widespread use of
health care insurance causes the overutilization of medical resources).
15. See BAKER, supra note 11, at 135 ("If doctors had a clear, evidence-based standard for
deciding when to order a test or a procedure, then they could ... be more confident that they were
doing the right thing. And they should be more confident that they would not be held liable for
any unfortunate result"). It is undoubtedly true that "blaming the liability system as the sole
cause of spending on unnecessary procedures and tests is problematic." David A. Hyman &
Charles Silver, The Poor State of Health Care Quality in the U.S.: Is Malpractice Liability Part of
the Problem or Part of the Solution?, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 893, 938 (2005). That, of course, does
not mean that the liability system is exonerated for its contributory role in encouraging
(providing an incentive toward) defensive practices. It may be that defensive practices (over-
deterrence of cost-containment activities) are more likely to occur on the part of physicians than
on the part of managed care organizations. There is "some reason to believe that managed care
organizations are better positioned to process liability signals than are individual clinicians,"
since "managed care organizations are in the business of spreading risk, and, with time and
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II. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE DOCTRINE: IN GENERAL
A. Some Conceptual Background
"Fundamental to an understanding of a discussion of the legal
liability regime is an awareness of competing visions of medical care-
the professional model and an economic model."16 The professional
model builds on what its adherents take to be a foundational insight-
that doctors and patients face a market failure, an asymmetry of
information. 17 Patients lack information and knowledge; physicians
possess scientific expertise. "The professional model substitutes
professional control of decision-making for that of consumers," with
medical decisions being "conceived of as technical judgments that rely
on scientific knowledge" and in which the "only legitimate questions
are scientific."'
8
The market model recognizes that a "number of the
assumptions underlying the traditional professional model have been
called into question," observing that, contrary to the tenets of the
professional/scientific paradigm, 19 "incentives seem to have an effect
on behavior in medical care decision-making."20 In this view, market
failure from asymmetric information is addressed by improving the
flow of information to patients, thereby empowering them.21 In
addition, the existence of clinical uncertainty22 "raises important
questions about the assumption that science commands a single
experience, should be more able to gauge their response to the increased risk of liability." Gail B.
Agrawal & Mark A. Hall, What If You Could Sue Your HMO? Managed Care Liability Beyond the
ERISA Shield, 47 ST. Louis L.J. 235, 270-71 (2003).
16. Blumstein, The Legal Liability Regime, supra note 9, at 125. For a discussion of these
competing visions of medical care, see James F. Blumstein, Health Care Reform and Competing
Visions of Medical Care: Antitrust and State Provider Cooperation Legislation, 79 CORNELL L.
REV. 1459, 1463-69 (1994) (discussing the professional and market paradigms).
17. See Kenneth Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM.
ECON. REV. 941 (1963) (noting the significance of the asymmetry of information between expert
physicians and uninformed patients/consumers).
18. Blumstein, The Legal Liability Regime, supra note 9, at 126-27.
19. Id. at 126 (noting that, under the professional model, "[f0inancial incentives do not
(empirically) and should not (normatively) affect professional judgment, which is based on
scientific criteria"). For a skeptical discussion of the effect of financial incentives in clinical
decisionmaking, see David M. Frankford, Managing Medical Clinicians' Work Through the Use of
Financial Incentives, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 71 (1994).
20. Blumstein, The Legal Liability Regime, supra note 9, at 127.
21. Id. at 128.
22. See, e.g., Barbara J. McNeil, The Shattuck Lecture - Hidden Barriers to Improvement in
the Quality of Care, 245 N. ENG. J. MED. 1612, 1612 (2001) (noting the prevalence of clinical
uncertainty).
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pathway of diagnosis or treatment."23 Under the market model, "[t]he
goal is to recognize and make use of incentives to achieve balanced
decisions that account for both medical and economic considerations,
as is the case in a typical market transaction."
24
The implications of the different paradigms-the "different
ways of thinking about medical care"25-for a legal liability regime are
considerable: "If one believes that medical care decision-making does
in fact and normatively should reflect an exclusive focus on science,
use of economic criteria in such decision-making is anathema," a
"'corruption' of medical judgment," since it diverts attention from the
scientific ideal ("pursuit of a single right way of doing things") to an
approach that "advocates the virtues of pluralism in the marketplace
and the desirability of choice based on individual preferences."
26
B. The "Customary Practice" Standard of Care
Conventional medical malpractice doctrine is clearly located in
the space of the professional paradigm and adheres to the
assumptions of that paradigm. It is built on the professional/scientific
model.
Medical malpractice doctrine relies on a professional standard
and delegates standard-setting to the physician, as professional,
through that professional standard. 27  The assumption-consistent
with the scientific model-is that the profession (from its expertise)
knows what works and that it has adopted and applied a scientifically-
derived standard of practice. That is, a core assumption of
conventional medical malpractice doctrine is that, as a scientific
matter, a standard of practice exists and that, as an empirical matter,
practitioners conform their conduct to that standard.
This vision is doctrinally embodied in the customary practice
standard of medical liability. Medical malpractice doctrine relies on
the "customary practices of the medical profession as the benchmark
23. Blumstein, The Legal Liability Regime, supra note 9, at 127.
24. Id. at 128.
25. Id. at 129.
26. Id. at 129-30.
27. For discussion of the use of private standards in lawmaking in a different context, see
Lawrence A. Cunningham, Private Standards in Public Law: Copyright, Lawmaking and the
Case of Accounting, 104 MICH. L. REV. 291 (2005) (discussing the government's adoption of and
use, in performing a regulatory function, of standards that have been developed, promulgated,
and even copyrighted by nongovernmental organizations).
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of acceptable behavior."28 The customary practice standard must be
established by appropriate expert medical testimony.2
9
Adherence to the customary practice approach is "essentially
an empirical inquiry that focuses on the ways things are customarily
done in the [relevant] medical community."30 That is "[i]n theory at
least, the jury determines what the customary practice is. It does not
decide what the custom ought to be." 31 This contrasts with the theory
in ordinary tort cases in which "the defendant's compliance with
custom is admissible, but not binding on the jury,"32 and in which
juries are charged with weighing risks and benefits to determine what
behavior is deemed culpable as negligent.
In short, conventional medical malpractice doctrine is firmly
rooted in the professional/scientific paradigm, "premised on the notion
that there is a single correct [scientifically derived] way to provide
medical care."33  Reliance on and deference to customary practice
"reflects a belief that science determines the propriety of a diagnosis
or treatment decision, that professional decision-makers have the
knowledge to determine what standards are dictated by the scientific
evidence, and that economic trade-offs have virtually no role in the
medical care decision-making process." 34 Thus, the professional
staLuaru governing medical liability is based in professional nnrms
and on the "assumption that science has established a single or
unitary standard of practice and that unitary standard is in fact
uniformly implemented in the medical profession. '35
The customary practice standard is operationalized in medical
malpractice doctrine by requiring a plaintiff to establish: "(a) the
appropriate standard of care, (b) breach of that standard of care, and
28. Henderson & Siliciano, supra note 10, at 1384.
29. Hood v. Phillips, 554 S.W.2d 160, 165-66 (Tex. 1977).
30. Blumstein, Cost Containment and Medical Malpractice, supra note 9, at 89.
31. Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Quiet Demise of Deference to Custom: Malpractice Law at the
Millennium, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 163, 164 (2000) [hereinafter Peters, The Quiet Demise of
Deference to Custom]. Professor Peters has also noted that, in a medical malpractice case,
conventional doctrine contemplates that "the jury's inquiry is positive, rather than normative."
Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Role of the Jury in Modern Malpractice Law, 87 IOwA L. REV. 909, 920
(2002); see also James F. Blumstein, Rationing Medical Resources: A Constitutional, Legal, and
Policy Analysis, 59 TEX. L. REV. 1345, 1396 (1981) [hereinafter Blumstein, Rationing Medical
Resources] (same).
32. Peters, The Quiet Demise of Deference to Custom, supra note 31, at 164.
33. Blumstein, Cost Containment and Medical Malpractice, supra note 9, at 89.
34. Blumstein, The Legal Liability Regime, supra note 9, at 132.
35. Id.; cf. Agrawal & Hall, supra note 15, at 285 ("'Medical custom' as a legal standard of
care is based on a fallacy: that there exists one single correct medical response to every clinical
problem and moreover that this single correct response is, and should be, determined without
reference to cost.").
1024 [Vol. 59:4:1017
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(c) a causal relationship between the breach of the standard and the
medical injury."
36
In tort generally, use of customary practice as a benchmark is
often seen as a market-validated standard that appropriately (i.e.,
optimally) balances costs and benefits, risks and rewards. In the
medical liability context, however, that market-validation has been
called into question as not reflecting a "socially optimal level of care."
3 7
The prevalence of third-party medical insurance allows patients and
providers to "overutiliz[e]... medical resources" because they are
"partially free[d] ... from cost constraints in choosing among
treatments."38 Thus, the argument has been made that use of the
"customary practice" standard may bias the standard in an
inappropriate, sub-optimal upward direction since, among other
things, "decisionmakers often lack the [financial] incentive or the
ability to make appropriate choices among such solutions."
39
Other critics "rebel at the notion of delegating the standard of
care to a profession."40 For these commentators, the focus is not on
the potential for ratcheting up levels of care inappropriately but on
the ability of the medical profession "to retain sub-optimally low levels
of care, essentially insulating itself from external scrutiny and
accountability." 41 Such commentators advocate "that the empirical
inquiry embodied in the customary practice standard.., be modified
by a normative judgment about the propriety of the customary
practice." 42  This is sometimes labeled the "accepted practice"
standard,43 and some courts have adopted that approach. 44 Indeed,
Professor Peters has identified a movement away from the "customary
practice" standard to a "reasonable physician" standard, driven by a
judicial belief that the customary practice standard is insufficiently
protective of patients' interest in quality. 45
36. Blumstein, Cost Containment and Medical Malpractice, supra note 9, at 89.
37. Henderson & Siliciano, supra note 10, at 1393.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1394.
40. Blumstein, The Legal Liability Regime, supra note 9, at 131.
41. Id.
42. Blumstein, Cost Containment and Medical Malpractice, supra note 9, at 89.
43. See generally Joseph H. King Jr., In Search of a Standard of Care for the Medical
Profession: The 'Accepted Practice" Formula, 28 VAND. L. REV. 1213 (1975) (defining, analyzing,
and advocating the "accepted practice" standard of care).
44. See, e.g., Blair v. Eblen, 461 S.W.2d 370, 373 (Ky. 1970) (holding that a physician has "a
duty to use that degree of care and skill which is expected of a reasonably competent practitioner
in the same class to which [the physician] belongs, acting in the same or similar circumstances").
45. Peters, The Quiet Demise of Deference to Custom, supra note 31, at 170-72; see also
Peters, The Role of the Jury, supra note 31, at 913-17 (same).
1025
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
As a practical matter, if "private medical practitioners seek to
engage in cost containment rationing on their own, they risk running
afoul of either the customary or accepted practice rule."46 As one court
has stated, "when a particular mode of treatment is upheld by a
consensus of opinion among the members of the profession, it should
be followed by the ordinary practitioner; and, if a physician... sees fit
to experiment with some other mode, he should do so at his peril."47
Rigid and mechanical application of customary practice standards in
managed care, therefore, "could reduce [HMOs'] ability to adopt
innovative styles of practice," which would allow for consideration of
cost-containment objectives. 48
C. The Problem of Uncertainty
From the perspective of liability standards, the key strategic
issue is how to develop standards for the regime of medical liability
that are consistent with the twin objectives of promoting and
maintaining high (optimum) levels of quality and accommodating the
important objective of containing medical care costs. 49 What are the
implications for system design and resource allocation when clinical
and structural uncertainty e.xist? 50
1. Clinical Uncertainty: Its Embarrassing Implications
Recognition of the existence of clinical uncertainty stems from
evidence of wide variation in practice patterns unexplained by
outcomes data. 51  The existence of clinical uncertainty is an
embarrassment 52 to adherents to the professional/scientific model
46. Blumstein, Rationing Medical Resources, supra note 31, at 1397.
47. Jackson v. Burnham, 39 P. 577, 580 (Colo. 1895).
48. Blumstein, Rationing Medical Resources, supra note 31, at 1399.
49. See generally MORREIM, supra note 9 (examining the problems associated with
incorporating cost factors when imposing medical liability on physicians and health plans and
proposing reshaped legal standards to address these issues); Rolph, supra note 37.
50. For a discussion of the impact that uncertainty might have on physician
decisionmaking, see Michelle M. Mello, Of Swords and Shields: The Role of Clinical Practice
Guidelines in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 149 U. PENN. L. REV. 645, 647-48 (2001).
51. See, e.g., John W. Wennberg, Variation in Use of Medicare Services Among Regions and
Selected Academic Medical Centers: Is More Better?, COMMONWEALTH FUND PUB. No. 874, at 4
(Dec. 2005) [hereinafter Wennberg, Variation in Use of Medicare Services] (noting "striking
regional variations in the proportion of early stage breast cancer patients who undergo
lumpectomy" and identifying "idiosyncratic practice style" as the "major source of such widely
varying discretionary surgery rates").
52. While the existence of clinical uncertainty calls into question the underlying scientific
basis of medicine, the resulting discretion gives physicians "considerable freedom and power,"
encroachments on which have been resisted. Hyman & Silver, supra note 15, at 952-53.
1026 [Vol. 59:4:1017
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because it challenges the underlying scientific foundation of that
model. In a fundamental way and in many areas of practice, the
widespread existence of clinical uncertainty calls into question a
cornerstone of medical malpractice law-the assumption that there is
a professionally determined and scientifically validated standard of
care.
Health services research, pioneered by Dr. John E. Wennberg
of Dartmouth Medical School, shows dramatic and scientifically
unexplained variations in medical practice patterns across geographic
regions-clinical uncertainty.53 "These data call into question the
hard scientific basis of much medical practice, and advocates of the
strict scientific viewpoint have been critical of this variation."5 4 These
variations in clinical practice "are unaccompanied by comprehensive
data to answer the fundamental question of which practice style is
most effective clinically." 55  These findings have spurred intense
efforts at outcomes research to improve knowledge in these areas of
clinical uncertainty.
56
The long and the short of it is that "the existence of clinical
uncertainty as reflected in variable practice data calls into question
the infrastructure of medical malpractice law."57 The question at the
heart of medical liability litigation-what is the "customary practice"
on a national basis with regard to a certain field of practice-"is ... a
question to which there cannot be, for many diagnosis and treatment
decisions, a coherent answer."58
This suggests that, as an alternative to the "customary
practice" approach, it may be appropriate to "unify[] medical
malpractice doctrine with the rest of tort law under the reasonably
53. See, e.g., JOHN E. WENNBERG ET AL., THE DARTMOUTH ATLAS OF HEALTH CARE IN THE
UNITED STATES (Megan McAndrew Cooper ed., 1996) (demonstrating substantial geographic
variation in the provision of health care services). More recent work shows variation in practice
patterns among hospitals rated as the best by U.S. News & World Report, some in the same
community. See Wennberg, Variation in Use of Medical Services, supra note 51, at 12 (observing
that even among hospitals "selected for their reputations for high-quality care," there was a
marked difference "in the way they managed severely ill Medicare patients ... even among
hospitals in the same state or city").
54. Blumstein, The Legal Liability Regime, supra note 9, at 136 (citation omitted). See
generally Lucian L. Leape, Error in Medicine, 272 JAMA 1851 (1994) (discussing the sources of
medical errors and their impact on clinical treatment).
55. Blumstein, The Legal Liability Regime, supra note 9, at 136. See generally Mark
Chassin et al., Variations in the Use of Medical and Surgical Services by the Medicare
Population, 314 N. ENG. J. MED. 285 (1986) (demonstrating significant variations in procedure
rates and acknowledging that they did not know the "correct" use rate for various procedures).
56. See infra Part III.A (discussing the influence that the data on clinical uncertainty has
had on the movement for development of practice guidelines).




prudent practitioner standard,"59 which could allow for "consideration
of such special factors as practice style (thereby accommodating
HMOs and other managed care environments) and resource
availability (thereby recognizing that medical insurance is not
monolithic and that resource availability varies)."6
0
2. Structural Uncertainty
Customary practice standards are not typically written down;
they are traditionally established by expert testimony in a court in the
context of a medical liability action. That is, they are not only
imprecise but not definitively established until after a medical injury
has occurred, a context in which a risk of injury (an ex ante
perspective) has been transformed into an ex post reality. The context
is that of an identified individual 61 victimized by an adverse outcome.
Under current medical malpractice doctrine, therefore,
controlling professional standards are set or at least operationalized ex
post by selectively drawn expert witness testimony-not by a process
in which a known organization systematically establishes in advance a
standard of practice that governs the determination of liability. This
after-the-fact process of professional standard-setting creates
structural uncertainty-the uncertainty imposed by the liability
system attributable to this ex post method of determining liability.
If structural uncertainty induces unwarranted and costly
precautions-as the "defensive medicine" account teaches62-then
patients may face more cost and risk while not actually receiving
59. Id.
60. Id. at 138; see Hood v. Phillips, 554 S.W.2d 160, 165 (Tex. 1977) (adopting reasonable
prudent physician standard); MORREIM, supra note 9, at 55-79 (exploring the legal liability
issues associated with health plans' control over physicians' treatment decisions and advocating
an approach that balances health plans' and physicians' relative expertise in allotting clinical
control); Randall Bovbjerg, The Medical Malpractice Standard of Care: HMOs and Customary
Practice, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1375, 1386 (suggesting an HMO-custom standard of care); Peters, The
Role of the Jury, supra note 31, at 958-67 (advocating substitution of reasonable physician
standard for professional customary practice standard).
61. For a discussion of the significance of context in medical care decisionmaking-i.e., the
impact of medical decisions on "clearly identifiable individuals"-, see James F. Blumstein,
Constitutional Perspectives on Governmental Decisions Affecting Human Life and Health, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1976, at 231, 250-53.
62. See Daniel P. Kessler & Mark B. McClellan, How Liability Law Affects Medical
Productivity, 21 J. HEALTH ECONS. 931, 946-48 (2002) (observing that "greater malpractice
pressure leads to significant increases in [certain] hospital expenditures ... but not to important
changes in health outcomes," thereby suggesting that "greater malpractice pressure" promotes
defensive medicine); Kessler & McClellan, supra note 12, at 388 (concluding that "treatment of
elderly patients with heart disease does involve 'defensive' medical practices, and that limited
reductions in liability can reduce these costly practices").
1028 [Vol. 59:4:1017
2006] DEVELOPING MALPRACTICE "SAFE HARBORS"
additional (or at least warranted) protection against clinical
uncertainty. This suggests that careful attention must be devoted to
structural as well as clinical uncertainty. The shaky infrastructure of
the "customary practice" standard for medical liability (derived from
clinical uncertainty) is exacerbated by the ad hoc and ex post nature of
its implementation (structural uncertainty).
3. Implications
The existence of clinical uncertainty "leaves the issue to fact-
finders to resolve on grounds other than observed empiricism or
scientific evidence of outcomes in many circumstances." 63  That, in
turn, "raises the question whether experts in those contested areas
can even be asked to testify reliably under the current standards
governing the admissibility of expert testimony."64 The uncertainty of
the standards places medical practitioners in the uncomfortable
position of not knowing what is expected or what is required to avoid
liability. The cost implications of such uncertainty and the costly
steps necessary to overcome that uncertainty may be substantial, as
the defensive medicine account of cost escalation asserts.
Clinical uncertainty (the uncertainty associated with the
imprecise nature of medical malpractice standards of practice) is
exacerbated by structural uncertainty (the ex post nature of the
process for determining the applicable standard). At the time of
diagnosis or treatment, the physician is unable to determine with
precision what the appropriate standard of care is. The standard is
only knowable ex post, after a medical injury has occurred, when a
factfinder determines (based on competing versions of expert
testimony) what the standard is.65
Of course, this observation is generically applicable to tort
standards, which are only knowable ex post. But an important
distinction exists between conventional tort standards and medical
63. Blumstein, The Legal Liability Regime, supra note 9, at 137.
64. Id. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589-92 (1993) (discussing
the reliability and relevance requirements that must be satisfied for expert testimony to be
admissible); see also Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 151-52 (1999) (noting that
Daubert's objective "is to ensure the reliability and relevancy of expert testimony... [and] to
make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal
experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the
practice of an expert in the relevant field").
65. The existence of clinical uncertainty "essentially allows the jury to impose, based on its
own independent judgment, the governing standard of care-the very result malpractice law
attempts to avoid." Mark A. Hall, The Defensive Effect of Medical Practice Policies in Malpractice




malpractice standards. A tort defendant under the typical reasonable
prudent person standard may defend its conduct on the ground that
the behavior is reasonable-that it reflects a prudent balance of risks,
costs, and benefits. Custom is only evidence of the negligence
standard.
In medical malpractice cases, that normative defense is
unavailable. In the traditional model of medical malpractice liability,
a physician is unable to defend his or her conduct on the basis that it
reflects a reasonable accommodation of the various risks, costs, and
benefits. The inquiry in medical malpractice cases is, at least in
theory, an empirical one: what is the customary practice of physicians
in the same or similar jurisdiction (or nationally in many
circumstances)? Failure to conform to that customary practice
standard means failure to conform to the law since the customary
practice of peer physicians is not just evidence of the standard but the
standard itself. To the extent that normative balancing enters into
the calculation, that balancing is done by the profession in
establishing the pattern of customary practice.
66
Accordingly, the stakes for physicians are, on theoretical
grounds, much higher on this dimension alone. Deviation from
customary practices is a deviation from the tort-imposed standard; a
defense of reasonableness under the circumstances is unavailable.
The consequence for the physician is that the uncertainty of ex post
standard-setting is of considerably greater moment. Absent an ability
to defend against a medical malpractice claim on the ground of
reasonableness, the physician has a powerful incentive to conform to
the obligatory customary practice standard. Its imprecision and its
determination ex post may lead to rational conforming behavior-
defensive medicine-that overshoots the mark of optimal precaution.
66. The "respectable minority" doctrine is a limited restraint on this in that it "give[s]
flexibility to the exercise of clinical judgment" by allowing physicians to escape liability if they
conform their conduct to that practiced by a "respectable minority" of the profession. Blumstein,
Rationing Medical Resources, supra note 31, at 1396. The "respectable minority" doctrine holds
that "a physician does not incur liability merely by electing to pursue one of several recognized
courses of treatment." Downer v. Veilleux, 322 A.2d 82, 87 (Me. 1974). This is a doctrinal
recognition of variations in practice, acknowledging that conformity to a respectable school of
thought in medical practice will suffice, even if not entirely in sync with overall customary
practice standards.. Typically, the respectable minority doctrine has both a qualitative
component-the school of thought must gain professional acceptance-and a quantitative
component-the school of thought must have a number of adherents, not just reflect the
idiosyncratic judgment of an individual practitioner. See Jones v. Chidester, 610 A.2d 964, 969
(Pa. 1992) ("Where competent medical authority is divided, a physician will not be held
responsible if in the exercise of his judgment he followed a course of treatment advocated by a
considerable number of recognized and respected professionals in his given area of expertise.").
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In the face of uncertainty-the ambiguous customary practice
standard compounded by the ex post nature of the determination of
that standard-physician conduct can be expected to reflect an
adjustment for the risk of liability, resulting in excessively costly
practice behavior. The prevalence of third-party payment for medical
care makes this type of adaptive behavior on the part of providers
easier to effectuate, thereby posing an especially significant resource
allocation concern. The nature of medical malpractice doctrine-the
professional customary practice standard-and the widespread
presence of third-party payment, which facilitates (by paying for)
defensive practices that may result from clinical and structural
uncertainty, are not typically found linked together in other areas of
tort law. This linkage makes for a particularly troubling potential for
substantial impact on resource expenditures on defensive practices in
medical care decisionmaking.
III. A RESPONSE TO UNCERTAINTY: EXANTE STANDARDS As SAFE
HARBORS
The appropriate response to unproductive uncertainty-clinical
and structural-is to reduce it. One way to do this is through properly
designed and implemented ex ante standard-setting. 67  Such ex ante
standards can reduce both clinical and structural uncertainty.
Clinical uncertainty can be reduced because the standard-setting
process evaluates clinical and other appropriate evidence and resolves
uncertainty by adopting standards. Structural uncertainty is reduced
because standards, if properly developed and implemented for this
purpose, are set in advance and are thereby knowable.
67. To the extent that guidelines are vague or proliferate regarding specific conditions or
treatment options, they may increase uncertainty and thereby exacerbate the defensive medicine
problem. For discussions of these issues, see Mello, supra note 50, at 686-90; Arnold J. Rosoff,
The Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines in Health Care Reform, 5 HEALTH MATRIX 369, 386
(1995) ("[A] pluralistic system allowing alternative, conflicting guidelines is inherently untidy
and undoubtedly would complicate matters by inviting controversy over which guideline should
be regarded as authoritative, or more authoritative . . . . Perhaps this would lead to better, more
confident judicial decisionmaking; perhaps it just would lead to more confusion.").
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A. Standard-Setting: Some Background
The idea of ex ante standard-setting is far from new.
68
Standards of practice have previously been recommended on grounds
of quality assurance and cost containment. 69 The federal government
in 1989 specifically promoted the development of guidelines, 70 giving
impetus to the guidelines movement.7 1 But the use of guidelines has
been controversial.7 2 Even the proper nomenclature has been the
subject of dispute.
73
Guidelines have been advanced as a tool for implementing
evidence-based medicine, 74 responding to the findings of clinical
uncertainty in observed medical practice.7 5 While recognizing that
such guidelines might have a salutary effect on the tort system of
liability, 76 skeptical commentators have expressed concern that the
"battle to capture the machinery for making practice guidelines may
be little more than another skirmish in the long war between the
medical profession and political institutions for control of the health
care system's regulatory apparatus."
77
The Institute of Medicine has described guidelines in
comprehensive terms-as "systematically developed statements to
assist practitioner and patient decisions about appropriate health care
68. See Clark C. Havighurst, Practice Guidelines as Legal Standards Governing Physician
Liability, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1991, at 87, 87 [hereinafter Havighurst, Practice
Guidelines As Legal Standards] (noting that, in the view of some advocates, practice guidelines
"are widely viewed as a potential panacea for many of the health care industry's most pressing
problems," such as being a possible means of "ameliorat[ing] the problems associated with the
law governing medical malpractice").
69. David M. Eddy, Clinical Decision-Making: From Theory to Practice. Practice Policies-
What Are They?, 263 JAMA 877, 877-78 (1990) (presenting various practice policies).
70. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 § 6103, Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2106,
2189-2209, 42 U.S.C. § 299b-l(b)(3) (2006).
71. See Havighurst, Practice Guidelines As Legal Standards, supra note 68, at 90
(discussing the budget reconciliation legislation's effect on the guidelines movement).
72. See Clark C. Havighurst, Practice Guidelines for Medical Care: The Policy Rationale, 34
ST. Louis U. L.J. 777, 779 (1990) [hereinafter Havighurst, Practice Guidelines for Medical Care)
(outlining the basic issues in the debate over the guidelines that are further discussed in the
article).
73. PHYSICIAN PAYMENT REVIEW COMM'N, 1989 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 220 n.1, 226
n.14 (describing different terms, such as "practice parameters," "pathway guidelines," or "clinical
standards" and emphasizing the difference between the type of practice guidelines that focus on
a particular procedure and those that focus on a particular patient problem).
74. See Hyman & Silver, The Poor State of Health Care Quality in the U.S., supra note 15,
at 990 (recognizing the propriety of allowing compliance with evidence-based medicine standards
as an absolute defense to a medical malpractice claim).
75. See Havighurst, Practice Guidelines As Legal Standards, supra note 68, at 88-90.
76. Id. at 96.
77. Id. at 92.
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for specific clinical circumstances. '"7 8 In this sense, guidelines can be
seen as "consensus statements developed by various bodies-public
and private-about what constitutes appropriate treatment for a
specific condition, set of symptoms, or preventive care goal."
79
While guidelines can be developed by diverse groups,80 they
have often been promoted by professional medical societies seeking to
improve the quality of care.81 These guidelines (reflective of the
Institute of Medicine's broad conceptual approach), however, "tend to
be broad and flexible in nature, leaving substantial room for
physicians to exercise clinical judgment."8 2 Such guidelines have been
infrequently invoked.
8 3
The usefulness of guidelines from a defensive liability
viewpoint becomes adulterated to the extent that the guidelines are
ambitious (i.e., comprehensive) and thereby imprecise. Guidelines
that provide flexible floors or ceilings-professionally-preferred
practice parameters-may furnish providers with useful boundaries of
practice,8 4 but they do not well perform the role of ex ante standards in
the context of medical malpractice. To be effective from a defensive
viewpoint, guidelines "must be both prescriptive and precise,"8' 5 and
there must be a "single" guideline upon which a physician can rely.8 6
That is, an effective8 7 guideline must be modest in ambition,
narrow in design and scope, and precise in its prescriptive approach.88
78. COMMITTEE ON CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINES, GUIDELINES FOR CLINICAL PRACTICE 2
(Marilyn J. Field & Kathleen N. Lohr eds., 1992) (internal quotes omitted). See Steven H. Woolf,
Practice Guidelines, a New Reality in Medicine: II. Method of Developing Guidelines, 152
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 946 (1992) (describing the process of developing guidelines).
79. Mello, supra note 50, at 647.
80. See Andrew L. Hyams et al., Practice Guidelines and Malpractice Litigation: A Two- Way
Street, 122 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 450 (1995) (noting that the federal government has
"committed substantial resources to guideline development," that numerous professional
organizations have advocated the use of guidelines "to improve quality of care," and that "more
than 1400 sets of guidelines" exist).
81. See Edward B. Hirshfeld, From the Office of the General Counsel: Should Practice
Parameters Be the Standard of Care in Malpractice Litigation?, 266 JAMA 2886, 2887 (1991)
(noting that "practice parameters" can reduce the amount of inappropriate care, reduce the
incidence of "avoidable injuries," and reduce the amount of defensive medicine).
82. Mello, supra note 50, at 650.
83. Id. at 676; Hyams et al., supra note 80, at 650.
84. Some evidence exists that these guidelines are not adhered to in practice. See Elizabeth
A. McGlynn et al., The Quality of Health Care Delivered to Adults in the United States, 348 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 2635, 2635 (2003) (finding that patients included in the study received about half of
the recommended care).
85. Hall, Defensive Effect, supra note 65, at 142.
86. Mello, supra note 50, at 686.
87. "Effective" in this context means effective in a medical-malpractice-defense context as
providing a vehicle for reducing the impetus toward defensive medicine.
1033
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Comprehensiveness and indeterminacy are the enemies of the modest,
targeted use of ex ante guidelines as legal standards. The
effectiveness of the strategy of using guidelines, established ex ante, as
legal standards to offset the impetus toward defensive medicine
practices turns on targeting specific circumstances and practices in
which high-cost defensive medicine practices may be addressed and
offset.8
9
In other words, to be useful in a defensive setting-as a defense
against defensive medicine-less is more in the guideline-construction
enterprise.
B. Ex Ante Guidelines/Standards as Medical Malpractice "Safe
Harbors"
To be successful in the defensive-medicine setting, guidelines
must be conceived of as narrowly targeted "safe harbors,"90 not as
flexible parametric guidelines generally reflective of and
accommodative of broad ranges of clinical practice. Yet, it is that very
type of precise, focused guideline that confronts professional
88. It may also be true that effectiveness from a quality-assurance perspective would be
improved by adherence to such design characteristics. Evidence of non-compliance with
guidelines suggests that better design may be important in improving the implementation of
guideline recommendations. See McGlynn et al., supra note 84 (detailing the results of a study
that concluded that patients participating in the survey received an average of half the
recommended care). For a discussion of how clinical guidelines can be used effectively "to
identify and eliminate inappropriate care," see Gerald B. Hickson et al., Development of an Early
Identification and Response Model of Malpractice Prevention, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. Winter
1997, at 7, 26. The salutary possibility exists, therefore, that guidelines designed with effective
medical malpractice defense in mind might have the consequence of improving quality by
increasing compliance (and providing an incentive for compliance).
89. See Studdert et al., supra note 13, at 2617 (noting the value of "developing and
disseminating clinical guidelines that target common defensive practices" such as "ordering
costly imaging studies").
90. Cf. Mark V. Pauly, Competition and New Technology, 24 HEALTH AFFS. 1523, 1534
(2005) (advocating "some type of legal safe harbor" to allow health plans to limit the introduction
of new technology on cost-effectiveness grounds).
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opposition, often as "cookbook medicine," 91 at least when perceived as
a comprehensive regulatory regime of medical practice.
92
The process of ex ante standard-setting provides an opportunity
for the introduction of cost-benefit considerations into the standard-
setting process. This is consistent with traditional negligence
principles, which involve a weighing of costs and benefits. Under the
professional customary practice standard, medical malpractice
doctrine delegates authority to set standards of practice to the medical
profession, "but it does so in the name of science not economics."
93
Some practitioners and theorists acknowledge that professional
standards, at least implicitly, take economic criteria into account.
94
But the traditional professional/scientific paradigm does not, at least
overtly, recognize the conventional balancing of costs and benefits that
underlies normal tort doctrines. "Indeed, some courts view the
introduction of economic trade-offs into medical care decision-making
to be corrosive or corruptive of the medical care decision-making
process."95 Ex ante standard-setting that has the force of law could,
therefore, serve as a constructive forum in which traditional economic
considerations could be introduced, consistent with professional
concerns about costly defensive medicine practices.
96
Reducing uncertainty-by clarifying standards of practice and
formulating them ex ante as standards set in advance to guide medical
decisionmaking-and introducing cost consciousness into that
standard-setting process require a rethinking of the traditional ex post
91. Professors Hyman and Silver provide a good discussion of this issue. They note that
clinical uncertainty gives physicians "considerable freedom and power" to exercise discretion in
clinical judgment. That discretion and the resultant autonomy of professionals in medical
decisionmaking are "likely... constrain[ed]" by "clinical practice guidelines," which are
"deride[d] ... as 'cookbook' medicine." Hyman & Silver, The Poor State of Health Care Quality in
the U.S., supra note 15, at 952. Accordingly, physicians have shown "[riesistance to guidelines"
and have slowed their development in ways that constrain physicians' practice autonomy. Id. at
955. Somewhat ironically, this resistance has impeded development of targeted safe-harbor
guidelines that could achieve medical malpractice defense objectives.
92. See Arnold J. Rosoff, Evidence-Based Medicine and the Law: The Courts Confront
Clinical Practice Guidelines, 26 J. HEALTH POLITICS POL. & L. 327, 329 (2001) [hereinafter
Rosoff, Evidence-Based Medicine] (discussing concerns with the potential result of comprehensive
guidelines); Havighurst, Practice Guidelines As Legal Standards, supra note 68, at 88-90
(detailing the origin and development of the movement to create practice guidelines).
93. Blumstein, The Legal Liability Regime, supra note 9, at 141.
94. See DAVID EDDY, CLINICAL DECISION MAKING: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 2 (1996).
95. Blumstein, The Legal Liability Regime, supra note 9, at 141-42.
96. See Studdert et al., supra note 13, at 2616 (noting that "the total cost of defensive
medicine is substantial" and that "practice guidelines" could "empower physicians to withhold
low-yield tests" whose costs outweigh their putative benefits). Cf. Hyman & Silver, The Poor
State of Health Care Quality in the U.S., supra note 15, at 990 (endorsing absolute defense for
physicians' compliance with "consensus standards of quality").
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case-by-case method of establishing the standard of care. In
developing narrowly conceived and highly targeted ex ante standards
as medical malpractice safe harbors, the standard-setting process
would migrate in those specially selected and carefully circumscribed
circumstances away from after-the-fact expert testimony about a
unitary national standard presented in the context of litigation. This
would shift not only the process of standard-setting but the timing as
well; the evaluation of risks and benefits would occur in advance when
the analysis would focus on the risk of injury-rather than in a
context in which the risk had already materialized as a result of an
adverse medical event. 97
One practical concern, from the defense viewpoint, about the
reliance on guidelines in medical malpractice matters has been the
possible "asymmetry" in their impact. 98 The fear is that failure of a
physician to adhere to a practice guideline would be harmful to a
defendant's case before a jury,99 but "[c]ompliance with a guideline
would not be as likely to insulate a physician from liability."100 To be
effective as a medical malpractice safe harbor, a guideline therefore
must not only be narrowly conceived in design, scope and
implementation, it must also have the force of law-not be evidence of
the standard of care but be the standard of care. Not only is this
important for defensive effectiveness, it is desirable from a balanced
(i.e., symmetrical) fairness perspective. If the ex ante standard
becomes the controlling legal standard, then the troubling problem of
asymmetric use of the guidelines disappears. 101 The guideline, as a
controlling legal standard, serves as an evenhanded metric-both as a
97. Facilitating contract-oriented approaches to medical liability might be desirable as a
way of rationalizing behavior and introducing cost consciousness into medical decisionmaking.
See CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE CHOICES: PRIVATE CONTRACTS AS INSTRUMENTS OF
HEALTH REFORM (1995) (advocating contract approach). This may be possible if the appropriate
basis for contractual obligations regarding medical liability can be established. See Dukes v. U.
S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350, 359 n.5 (3d Cir. 1995) (discussing the possibility that a health
care plan can contractually create its own set of standards of care, preempting state medical
malpractice law). But see infra note 105.
98. Blumstein, Making the System Work Better, supra note 3, at 414.
99. Guidelines, under this scenario, would be admitted into evidence in connection with
expert testimony as suggesting the appropriate customary standard-somewhat akin to the
status of a learned treatise. For a discussion of these evidentiary matters, see Mello, supra note
50, at 662-67 (explaining the evidentiary implications of CPGs).
100. Havighurst, Practice Guidelines As Legal Standards, supra note 68, at 105-06. See
Hyams et al., supra note 80, at 454 (guidelines were used more than twice as often for
inculpatory as for exculpatory purposes).
101. For an expression of concern with the asymmetric use of guidelines in the medical
malpractice setting, see Mello, supra note 50, at 695-704. The asymmetric use of guidelines
"arguably frustrates the rational use of guidelines in malpractice litigation." Hyams et al., supra
note 80, at 454.
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sword and a shield. Failure to comply with the standard constitutes a
breach of the duty of care; compliance with the standard (and non-
negligent implementation of the standard) satisfies the physician's
duty of care.
Normally, the way that a standard becomes an ex ante legal
standard is through legislation. 10 2 That certainly would be an option
for the type of standards advocated herein. But the legislative track
record does not suggest success. 10 3 In some circumstances, a standard
could be adopted through contract, 104 but uncertainty of enforceability
has resulted in little success in the contract realm. 10 5 This raises the
question whether a different vehicle exists through which narrowly
focused medical malpractice safe harbors can be promulgated with the
force of law. In the next Part, the potential role of Quality
Improvement Organizations ("QIOs") 10 6  in the standard-setting
process will be developed.
102. See Rosoff, Evidence-Based Medicine, supra note 92, at 339 (indicating that use of a
guideline as the "applicable legal standard.., would, presumably, require legislative action").
103. See Mello, supra note 50, at 674-77 (discussing the experience of states that have
adopted guidelines and provided an affirmative defense to physicians who comply with the
guidelines). The nature of the standard-setting process may not be the kind of initiative at which
legislatures excel; the expertise involved reflects the kind of decisionmaking that legislatures
often delegate to administrative agencies or nongovernmental standard-setting entities. See
generally Lisa Schultz Bressman, Schecter Poultry at the Millennium: A Delegation Doctrine for
the Administrative State, 109 YALE L.J. 1399, 1402 (2000) (advocating agency standard-setting).
104. See, e.g., Havighurst, Practice Guidelines as Legal Standards, supra note 68, at 108,
113-16 (asserting that an alternative to guidelines could be found in the contract between a
patient and his or her physician).
105. The Third Circuit decision in Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350, 359 n.5 (3d
Cir. 1995), suggested that the preemption provisions of the federal Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006), could authorize the use of employer-
sponsored health plans as a vehicle for superseding certain state tort doctrines through
employer-based contracting. Contractual adoption of "tort" standards through an employer's
health plan, under that theory, could serve as the standard of care in litigation involving
participants and beneficiaries of that plan, state medical malpractice law to the contrary
notwithstanding. Uncertainty about the enforceability of such provisions has left the idea
advanced tentatively in Dukes undeveloped.
106. Federal law refers to a "utilization and quality control peer review organization"
("PRO") as an entity with which the federal government contracts to provide designated services,
including the setting of "standards of health care." 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-3(a) (2006). The term
Quality Improvement Organization ("QIO") has been substituted for the term PRO in federal
regulatory parlance, e.g., the PROs with which the federal government now contracts to perform
PRO functions are called QIOs. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, MEDICARE'S QUALITY IMPROVEMENT
ORGANIZATION PROGRAM: MAXIMIZING POTENTIAL 29-32 (2006) [hereinafter 1OM QIO REPORT]
(describing and providing historical overview of QIO program). This change occurred when the
term QIO was substituted for the term PRO in the scope of work covering the contract period
1999-2002. Id. at 37 (noting change in terminology). Section 109(d) of the Medicare Prescription
Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, P.L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2173 (2003),
called for a study by the Institute of Medicine of the role of QIOs, which resulted in a report
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IV. QIOS AND MEDICAL MALPRACTICE STANDARD-SETTING
A provision in federal law since 1972-part of the original
Professional Standards Review Organization ("PSRO") legislation-
provides the vehicle for implementing the proposal put forward in this
Article.
107
A. The PSRO Legislation: Some Background
PSROs were established in 1972 as part of omnibus Social
Security Act amendments as "self-regulatory organizations of
physicians... charged with monitoring individual physicians'
decisions affecting the use of health care resources under federal
health programs."108  The PSRO legislation arose in the Senate
Finance Committee "against a background of intense concern...
about cost overruns in the Medicare and Medicaid programs." 10 9
Hospital utilization review was viewed as "ineffective as a curb to
unnecessary use of institutionalized care and services." 110  PSROs
institutionalized peer review, but placed authority for such review
(including utilization review) outside the control of individual
hospitals.
In recognition of the relationship between utilization control
and medical malpractice exposure, the PSRO legislation specifically
addressed the medical malpractice risk to providers that stems from
restraints on utilization in furtherance of cost-containment
objectives.1
B. Standard-Setting and Immunity-Conferring Authority of QIOs
"The federal PSRO legislation contains a provision that
immunizes from malpractice liability a physician who practices in
conformity with the standard set forth by the PSRO. The clear intent
of that provision was to remove the 'defensive medicine' excuse from
practitioners who claim that fear of malpractice liability causes them
published in March 2006. IOM QIO REPORT, supra. Accordingly, the more recent (and current)
term QIO will be used in this Article to refer to authority statutorily conferred on PROs.
107. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-6(c) (2006).
108. Clark C. Havighurst & James F. Blumstein, Coping with Quality/Cost Trade-offs in
Medical Care: The Role of PSROs, 70 Nw. U. L. REV. 6, 8 (1975).
109. Id. at 38.
110. S. REP. No. 92-1230, at 255 (1972) [hereinafter S. REP. No. 1230].
111. Blumstein, Rationing Medical Resources, supra note 31, at 1397.
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to order more costly testing than ordinarily called for in their clinical
judgment."112 The Senate Report is quite explicit about this point.
1 3
When doctors and institutional providers act "in compliance
with or reliance upon professionally developed norms of care and
treatment applied by" PSROs 1 4 (now QIOs), 115 42 U.S.C. §1320c-6(c)
provides immunity'1 6 for such doctors and institutional providers.
That is, if QIOs develop and apply standards of care for medical
practice, those standards become the standards for medical liability,
and "compliance with or reliance upon" those standards on the part of
providers cannot result in liability, provided that the provider
exercised "due care" in the implementation of those standards.11 7
In addressing the PSROs' standard-setting and immunity-
conferring authority, the Senate Report directly draws the
relationship between the statutory immunity provision and the costly
practice of defensive medicine. The Report notes that providers are
"exempt from civil liability arising from adherence to" the standards
set by the PSRO, "provided they exercise due care in the performance
of their functions."118 It then proceeds unambiguously to link this
immunity-conferring provision to the concern about defensive
medicine: "The intention of this provision. . . is to remove any
inhibition to ... the following by practitioners and providers, of
standards ... recommended by the review organization."'1 9 Thus, "a
physician following practices which fall within the scope of those
recommended by a PSRO would not be liable, in the absence of
negligence in other respects for having done so."1 20
The specific example used in the Report involves a typical
defensive medicine issue-length of stay. The Report addresses the
situation where the "usual length of stay for a given illness might be 6
days, but an individual practitioner might only hospitalize his patient
112. Id.
113. S. REP. No. 1230, supra note 110, at 267.
114. The PSRO program became the PRO program in 1982. Timothy Stoltzfus Jost,
Administrative Law Issues Involving the Medicare Utilization and Quality Control Peer Review
Organization (PRO) Program: Analysis and Recommendations, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 5 (1989).
115. See IOM QIO REPORT, supra note 106, at 3.
116. See Hall, Defensive Effect, supra note 65, at 136-40 (describing the statutory goal of
malpractice immunity from compliance with peer-review-established norms in PSROs); Note,
Federally Imposed Self-Regulation of Medical Practice: A Critique of the Professional Standards
Review Organization, 42 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 822, 838-42 (1974) (same); Kenneth W. Kleinman,
Comment, PSRO." Malpractice Liability and the Impact of the Civil Immunity Clause, 62 GEO. L.
J. 1499 (1974) (same).
117. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-6(c)(2) (2006).





for 4 days." 121 In such a circumstance, "to assure himself of exemption
from liability"-i.e., because of defensive medicine-"the doctor might
be motivated to keep his patient in the hospital for an extra 2 days."'
22
Adherence to a PSRO-developed standard that authorized a four-day
stay in such a situation would provide the practitioner with immunity
from medical malpractice as long as the practitioner does not
"misappl[y] the professional standards promulgated by a review
organization."1
23
Thus, since 1972 QIOs have been specifically authorized by
statute 124 to develop and implement standards of care as a tool for
dealing with the practice of defensive medicine. But this role has not
been part of their scope of work, 125 and QIOs have not pursued this
mission (even though they are and have been so authorized).
126
Within the framework of medical malpractice doctrine,
therefore, the first element-establishing a standard of care-can be
performed by a QIO if it were to establish and apply "professionally
developed norms of care and treatment."'127 When physicians or
institutional providers act "in compliance with or reliance on" QIO-
adopted "norms of care and treatment" and have exercised "due care"
in applying such "norms of care and treatment," they cannot be held
"civilly liable to any person under any law of the United States or of
any State (or political subdivision thereof) on account of any [such]
action."128
Since QIOs have not, as a general matter, implemented their
authority to set standards of care, it is uncertain just how far the
immunity-conferring authority extends. One could argue that because
the QIO authority developed in the context of concerns about cost
escalation in Medicare and Medicaid, QIO authority to set standards
of care that confer immunity for compliance only extends to care
provided under Medicare, Medicaid, or other federal programs. But
the statutory language itself contains no such limiting provision. It
seems to confer immunity on all providers that comply with or act in
reliance "upon professionally developed norms of care and treatment




124. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320c-2(c)(7), 3(a)(6) & (8) (2006).
125. IOM QIO REPORT, supra note 106, at 34-41.
126. See Hall, Defensive Effect, supra note 65, at 136-38 & n.77.
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context of QIO standard-setting authority to federal programs; this
suggests that the QIOs' immunity-conferring authority (and therefore
their medical malpractice standard-setting authority) extends to all
medical care, irrespective of payer.130
The QIOs' standard-setting process, if implemented, will not
eliminate the potential of litigation focusing on the "due care"
implementation issue. Negligence in carrying out the standard of care
would still result in liability if it causes injury. But the QIO standard-
setting process would allow for the development of ex ante standards
that could guide medical decisionmaking, thereby reducing some of
the clinical and structural uncertainty associated with such
desisionmaking. In short, QIOs possess the statutory authority to
develop standards that would serve as controlling legal standards in
medical malpractice litigation.
To be effective in performing its defensive role in cost
containment, such standard-setting must be precise and targeted, in
the nature of particularized safe harbors. Elimination of the standard-
setting component of putative liability litigation in carefully targeted
circumstances could reduce the scope of issues for potential liability
and contribute to cost-reduction from the development of practice
styles that comport with the standards developed and promulgated by
QIOs. Compliance with a previously developed and articulated
standard would allow practice styles to accommodate to those
standards, with the attendant cost reduction, even if in some cases
lack of due care in the implementation of the standards causes injury
and results in liability.
If QIOs took on this standard-setting assignment, their task
would be to identify and target areas in which ex ante standard-
setting can provide substantial cost-containment relief with little but
warranted (i.e., optimal) impact on quality. This could occur where
costly defensive medicine is currently being practiced and where
reduced uncertainty regarding liability could result in a more optimal
balance of costs and benefits. As suggested by the recent work of
Studdert et al,131 defensive diagnostic tests such as imaging (especially
in emergency settings) hold promise for utilization reduction through
ex ante standard setting. Similar savings might accrue in the area of
low-benefit yet expensive technology innovation.
132
130. For the suggestion that medical malpractice reform requires restructuring medical
liability insurance, and that payers such as Medicare should lead the way, see William M. Sage,
Medical Malpractice Insurance and the Emperor's Clothes, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 463, 464 & n.6,
484 & n.84 (2005).
131. Studdert et al., supra note 13, at 2616.
132. Pauly, supra note 90, at 1524-28, 1533-35.
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One way to get this ball rolling would be for the federal
government to commission a pilot study that would identify and
develop standards in areas in which optimization of existing practice
could benefit from the development and promulgation of ex ante
standards. Picking off the low-hanging fruit through a pilot study
could develop the approach, methodology, and analysis for pursuing
other carefully targeted "safe harbor" opportunities.
C. Can QIOs Perform the Standard-Setting Role?
While QIOs have-and have had for over thirty years-the
authority to engage in medical malpractice standard-setting, they
have not acted on this role. The existing federal scope of work, which
describes the contractual obligations of a QIO, does not contemplate
medical malpractice standard-setting as a contractual role for QIOs.
133
Historically, the tension between QIOs' role in cost
containment and quality assurance has been an underlying reality.
134
From the very outset of the PSRO program, organized medicine has
resisted a significant QIO role in cost containment. Thus, in 1974, the
director of the American Medical Association's Center for Health
Services Research and Development quite explicitly sought to redirect
the mission thrust of PSROs away from cost containment to quality
assurance:
It seems apparent after examining the [PSRO] legislation that the primary, if not
total intent of the program is to contain the cost of medical care. Despite the legislative
intent of the program, however, the concern of health care providers and insurers should
be to reassign priorities of the PSRO program to assure that maintenance of high
quality care is the primary focus of PSROs. 135
Over the years, the Medicare program itself has evolved as the
payment method shifted to a modified prospective payment system
based on diagnosis-related groups ("DRGs"). 136 "This system ended the
prior cost-related reimbursement system, under which Medicare had
reimbursed hospitals the costs they incurred in caring for Medicare
patients, and substituted for it a program that paid hospitals
primarily on a lump sum per hospitalization basis. ' 13 7 At least in the
hospital context, financial incentives shifted under prospective
133. See IOM QIO REPORT, supra note 106, at 40 (noting QIOs' focus on quality
improvement in scope of work governing the period 2005-2008).
134. See Havighurst & Blumstein, supra note 108, at 36-68 (explaining the competing goals
of quality assurance and cost containment).
135. Id. at 42 n.123.
136. Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat. 65 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
137. Jost, supra note 114, at 5.
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payment, so that hospitals had an incentive to under-serve rather
than to over-serve, as they did under cost-based reimbursement. The
shift in incentives raised the specter of lower quality hospital services
under Medicare and solidified the conception of QIOs as quality-
assurance institutions.
138
In this process of mission evolution, the QIOs' role in standard-
setting has remained in desuetude. It is not now part of the scope of
work of QIO contracts with the federal government. And a recently
released report on the role of QIOs by the prestigious Institute of
Medicine envisions the role of QIOs exclusively in the context of
quality-promotion 139 with barely a bow to the statutory cost-
containment mission of QIOs' PSRO forebears. 140 The single-minded
orientation of this recent report is reminiscent of the very early
attempts to blunt any cost-containment role for QIOs and, in that
respect, has a certain "Back to the Future" ambience. So, given the
history and the recent Institute of Medicine report that deemphasizes
any role for QIOs other than "the provision of technical assistance for
performance measurement and quality improvement,"1 41 one can
reasonably wonder whether QIOs can be tasked with the standard-
setting mission envisioned for them in this Article.
Despite this history and the Institute of Medicine report, there
are several reasons for cautious optimism. First, the QIOs' legal
authority for standard-setting has survived intact even as the mission
for QIOs themselves has evolved. And the standard-setting function
has remained in the authorizing statute. Thus, the legal capacity of
QIOs to perform the standard-setting function persists. It just needs
administrative resuscitation (or perhaps birthing would be a more
appropriate term).
Second, QIOs are not entirely dependent on their contract with
the federal government. They are authorized to contract with public
and private payers to perform review functions; 42 there does not seem
to be any express limitation on QIOs' ability to receive non-federal
funding to support their standard-setting function. Again, this has
been a largely unknown authority of QIOs, and, properly informed and
138. See id. at 5-6 (discussing the changed incentives and the resulting risk of decreased
quality of care).
139. See 1OM QIO REPORT, supra note 106, at 10 (QIOs should "concentrate their resources
on quality improvement efforts with providers").
140. Id. at 33.
141. Id. at 9.




energized, private entities might well seek to contract with QIOs to
support QIOs' standard-setting role.
Third, Congress in Section 109(d) of the Medicare Prescription
Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003143 commissioned
an overview by the Institute of Medicine of the QIO program. While
QIOs' standard-setting role was not on the radar screen of the
Institute of Medicine's review process and found no consideration in
its report, the recent release of the IOM's report will trigger discussion
within the Department of Health and Human Services and in
Congress about the appropriate role of and scope of work for QIOs in
the future. Consideration of QIOs' role in standard-setting is
therefore timely.
The vision for QIOs contained in the Institute of Medicine
report-institutions devoted to quality assurance-is not incompatible
with the ex ante standard-setting role for QIOs still contemplated in
the QIOs' underlying statute and advocated herein. Standard-setting
can well fit within an overall quality-enhancement agenda,144 so long
as quality is a broad enough notion that can accommodate the
introduction of cost-effectiveness considerations. Given the Bush
Administration's commitment to tort reform as a means of reducing
costs, it seems reasonable that the Administration would be drawn to
implement a strategy of dealing with the problem of defensive
medicine through a liability-based (and not only a remedy-centric)
approach. That liability-based strategy of reform can effectively be
addressed by invigorating QIOs' longstanding authority to set
controlling legal standards for medical malpractice.
D. Are There Liability Risks Associated With the Standard-Setting
Process Itself?
Participants in the putative QIO standard-setting process
would be empowered to develop appropriate standards of practice that
have teeth. This would allow those participants to have an impact on
the quality of care and on reducing unwarranted costs associated with
the excessive deterrence that may arise from complying with
ambiguous standards determined after-the-fact in a judicial
proceeding based on ad hoc testimony of experts with 20-20 hindsight.
This should provide a vehicle for physicians and other providers to
make a real contribution to rationalizing and optimizing the process of
143. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, P.L. No.
108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
144. See McGlynn, supra note 84, at 2644 (discussing ways to improve the deficits in receipt
of recommended medical care).
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care-delivery; this should be viewed as an act of physician
empowerment not alienation.
Would participants in this putative standard-setting process be
at-risk for liability for their role in a QIO's standard-setting process?
If so, this could be a significant practical impediment to implementing
this proposal for an expanded QIO standard-setting role.
The QIO statute contains two separate immunity provisions
that would seem to provide considerable immunity to QIOs, their
employees, and any person "who furnishes professional services to" a
QIO. 145
In general, persons who "provid[e] information" to QIOs cannot
be held liable "by reason of having provided such information."14 6
That is, those who provide information to QIOs are afforded immunity
from civil and criminal liability unless the information is "unrelated
to" a QIO's contractual function 147 or "is false and the person providing
it knew, or had reason to believe, that such information was false."148
This seems to be a broad immunity provision that protects against
good faith official conduct.
Some ambiguity arises with respect to the statutory immunity
provision regarding the performance of services by a QIO employee, a
person "who has a fiduciary relationship with" a QIO, or any person
who "furnishes professional services" to a QIO. 149 That immunity
seems weaker than the immunity granted for the provision of
information and only applies if "due care" is exercised in the
performance of "professional services. 15 °
While the statutory immunity provision seems to provide a
form of qualified rather than absolute immunity, the sparse case law
seems to support absolute immunity, at least in some contexts. In
Kwoun v. Southeast Missouri Professional Standards Review
Organization,1 51 the district court had granted qualified immunity to
the QIO-related defendants and to certain state defendants in the
context of a disciplinary proceeding; on appeal, the Eighth Circuit
awarded absolute immunity to those defendants (as well as to the
federal defendants).1 52 The dissent contended that the QIO-related
145. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320c-6(a) & (b) (2006).
146. Id. § 1320c-6(a).
147. Id. § 1320c-6(a)(1).
148. Id. § 1320c-6(a)(2).
149. Id. § 1320c-6(b).
150. Id.
151. 811 F.2d 401 (8th Cir. 1987).
152. Id. at 404, 406-10; accord Wood v. Freedman, No. 89-3685, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS
26317, at *2-3 (7th Cir. Oct. 25, 1991). These cases arose in the context of a PRO engaged in
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defendants and state defendants were only eligible for qualified
immunity under the QIO statute.
Under Kwoun, special attention must be given to determining
how best to structure the tasking of QIOs by the Department of
Health and Human Services. That structure and relationship could be
important in determining whether the immunity that attaches is
qualified or absolute. More generally, the risk of liability for
participation in the standard-setting process seems manageable and
unlikely to deter participation in the QIOs' putative standard-setting
mission.
V. CONCLUSION
The costs of medical malpractice and medical malpractice
litigation come in many flavors. To some extent, the existence of
medical malpractice itself through medical error contributes to lower
quality of care and to medical injury. 153 There has been much
criticism of the system of fault-determination and compensation as
excessively costly. 154 Because of variability, awards for noneconomic
loss have been the subject of criticism 155 and pose concerns regarding
horizontal and vertical equity. 156 Much of the recent tort and medical
malpractice reform has been directed at damages for noneconomic
loss, with questions being raised about their legitimacy and with
responses to those critiques. 157  This remedy-centric approach to
reform has led to the imposition of caps on damages for noneconomic
sanctioning conduct and applied absolute immunity on the model for prosecutorial and/or
adjudicative functions, both of which receive absolute immunity. Whether the same type of
immunity would be applied to the standard-setting, regulatory function of QIOs is uncertain. But
cf. Howard v. Suskie, 26 F.3d 84, 85, 87 (8th Cir. 1994) (distinguishing Kwoun and granting
qualified, not absolute, immunity for the performance of executive rather than adjudicative
function). At the same time, it is far from clear what party would be in a position to bring an
action against a QIO employee or agent for a QIO's standard-setting function.
153. See Hyman & Silver, supra note 15, at 900-09 (describing the magnitude of the problem
of medical error).
154. See O'Connell et al., supra note 3, at 277 (noting litigation-induced costs of medical
liability process).
155. Neil Vidmar, Pap and Circumstance: What Jury Verdict Statistics Can Tell Us About
Jury Behavior and the Tort System, 28 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1205, 1224 (1994) ("The 'pain and
suffering' component of jury awards represents one of the most criticized aspects of jury
behavior.").
156. See Blumstein, Making the System Work Better, supra note 3, at 403-04 (expressing
concern about systemic fairness in determination of noneconomic loss, while acknowledging the
legitimacy of providing recovery for noneconomic loss).
157. See supra note 3 (providing sources that critique the legitimacy of damages for
noneconomic loss).
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loss, 158 to resistance to those caps, 159 and to proposals for improving
the way that noneconomic loss is determined.
160
This Article has addressed the problem of cost not from a
remedy-centric perspective but from the perspective of the impact of
the liability-determination process on levels of utilization and
therefore cost.161 This is the defensive medicine perspective.
The system of establishing medical liability relies on the
professional customary practice standard and is premised on the
assumption that science determines a standard of care that controls
medical decisionmaking in individual circumstances. However,
evidence of unexplained practice variation calls this scientific premise
into question in a large number of situations. This clinical
uncertainty makes compliance with a standard of care difficult, even
mythical, in many clinical circumstances, yet that is the legal
standard upon which liability is determined. Further, because the
medical profession sets the standard, consideration of cost-benefit
issues in individual cases is not part of the liability-determination
process in medical malpractice cases. In this sense, medical liability is
unlike conventional tort cases, in which factfinders are expected to
weigh costs and benefits in deciding whether culpable conduct has
occurred in a specific context.
The uncertainty associated with clinical variation (clinical
uncertainty) and the inability of medical practitioners to defend their
conduct in individual cases on conventional tort cost-benefit grounds
are exacerbated by the after-the-fact method in which the professional
standard of care is established (structural uncertainty). Experts who
testify to the standard of care are assumed to be testifying about
scientifically-validated customary practices. But, given the existence
of clinical uncertainty, such after-the-fact testimony can be akin to
picking out a particular friend in a crowd, a selection influenced by the
reality that an injury has occurred and a potential risk has
158. See Sharkey, supra note 1, at 396 (noting that a majority of states "have imposed some
kind of cap or limitation on the amount of damages that plaintiffs can recover in a lawsuit").
159. See supra note 3 (providing sources that critique the legitimacy of damages for
noneconomic loss).
160. See, e.g., Avraham, supra note 2, at 110 (advocating "a system of nonbinding age-
adjusted multipliers ... associated with the medical costs of an injury"); Blumstein, Making the
System Work Better, supra note 3, at 411-13 (advocating use of scenarios to assist juries by
providing context for decisionmaking); Bovbjerg et al., supra note 2, at 939 (suggesting the use of
award matrices).
161. Cf. Blumstein, Making the System Work Better, supra note 3, at 415 ("If we can generate
real savings in the practice of medicine by the adoption of clear and definitive protocols of
practice, then that might well alleviate some pressure from-and be a safety valve for-some of
the other cost-based criticisms of the award of nonpecuniary damages.").
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materialized with a concomitant adverse outcome. Such ex post
standard-setting using the professional customary practice standard is
understandable in a medical-practice world characterized by scientific
evidence. But the evidence on clinical uncertainty undermines that
claim. This creates structural uncertainty, which makes compliance
with the after-the-fact "standards of care" difficult-pursuit of a
moving target.
The result of clinical and structural uncertainty is an incentive
for risk-averse medical decisionmaking-doing more than might be
medically optimal to avoid liability. One of the purposes of tort
liability in medical negligence cases is to achieve optimal deterrence,
but the existence of clinical and structural uncertainty suggests that
over-deterrence may occur in a significant number of cases with the
resultant escalation of unwarranted costs. Such type of defensive
medical decisionmaking is facilitated by the prevalence of third-party
payment, which facilitates and funds this type of risk-averse
decisionmaking by physicians. At the same time, the incentive for
increased utilization from fee-for-service payment by third-party
payers calls into question the very customary practice standard that
undergirds the medical negligence system; customary practice does
not exist in a vacuum. It is not solely scientifically driven, and to the
extent that there is an economic dimension, it conduces toward
greater utilization. That reduces the reliability that custom might
otherwise reflect in balancing cost and benefit in a less subsidized
market.
This Article has proposed the use of ex ante standard-setting as
a tool for reducing uncertainty faced by medical providers. This would
also allow for the appropriate balancing of costs and benefits in the
formulation of such protocols. The use of such standards or protocols
has "always failed" because "they can serve as just another tripwire
for liability for providers." 16 2 To be palatable, such standards must be
symmetrical-the controlling legal standard that serves both as a
sword and a shield. Deviation from the standard establishes breach of
the standard of care; compliance with the standard establishes
conformity to the standard of care. From a quality-assurance
perspective, this sword-and-shield dimension of symmetrical ex ante
standard setting creates a powerful incentive for such compliance.
"So, in order to make the ex ante standard-setting approach
work, there must be a process by which the standard that is set ex
ante becomes the controlling standard."163 The federal QIO legislation
162. Id. at 414.
163. Id.
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provides such a vehicle, allowing QIOs to establish practice standards
that become the standards of care. Such QIO-developed standards
trump state-created standards by conferring immunity for conduct in
compliance with the QIO standards.
To be effective as a defense against defensive medicine, such
QIO-developed standards must be modest in conception, narrow in
design, and targeted in their implementation. Comprehensiveness
and flexibility may be desirable objectives in practice guidelines aimed
to assist practitioners in improving the quality of their medical
decisionmaking practices, helping to shape the exercise of clinical
judgment. They are not desirable in the context of defending against
defensive medicine. In fact, such comprehensiveness and flexibility
would defeat the goals espoused herein.
Instead, the practice guidelines contemplated in this Article
must be targeted like a laser beam at narrow and specific
circumstances, providing specific guidance to practitioners in carefully
circumscribed situations. They should be conceived of as "safe
harbors," not as broad parameters of practice. These safe harbors
should be aimed at practices such as diagnostic imaging (especially in
emergency settings) and the introduction of new technology-areas in
which defensive practices are sub-optimal and areas in which quality
can be maintained while reducing cost. That substantial savings from
this type of intervention can be attained is strongly suggested by the
most recent work of Dr. Wennberg, who concludes that in "supply-
sensitive" areas of health care-"visits to physicians, diagnostic tests,
and hospitalizations, mostly for patients with chronic illnesses"-the
"most important problem is overuse" with the result that "patients are
exposed to the burdens and risks of treatment that is unnecessary or
counterproductive."
164
164. Wennberg, supra note 51, at 1-2.
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